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This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)(j) of the Utah Code. 
Introduction 
Utah courts have common law authority to change one’s legal status—the 
designations on a birth certificate—to reflect the reality of the person’s identity. If 
a person has assumed a name different from the one on the person’s birth 
certificate, a court can change the legal name to the name the person is known 
by, as long as the change is not for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose. In re Porter, 
2001 UT 70, ¶ 8, 31 P.3d 519. The Utah Code codifies the courts’ common law 
authority and the test for changes to a legal name. Utah Code §§ 26-2-11, 42-1-1. 
The Utah Code also recognizes that courts can change a person’s sex 
designation to reflect the reality of the person’s gender identity, but the statute 
does not expressly set forth a test for when such a change is appropriate. Id. 
§ 26-2-11(1). This court should clarify that the test for changing one’s sex 
designation is the same as the test for changing one’s legal name, with the 
obvious difference that, at the hearing, the court would receive evidence that the 
person’s gender identity is different from the one listed on the birth certificate.  
Fortunately, the Utah Legislature in the Fair Housing Act has described 
what type of evidence would prove a person’s gender identity at that hearing: 
“A person’s gender identity can be shown by providing evidence, including, but 
not limited to, medical history, care or treatment of the gender identity, 
consistent and uniform assertion of the gender identity, or other evidence that 
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the gender identity is sincerely held, part of a person’s core identity, and not 
being asserted for an improper purpose.” Id. § 57-21-2(16). As long as the sex 
designation on a petitioner’s birth certificate does not reflect the petitioner’s 
gender identity, the court should order that the legal sex designation be changed.  
Here, Jenny Sean Pace, a transgender man1 who was born a biological 
woman, filed a petition to change his legal name to a man’s name, Sean Childers-
Gray, and to change his sex designation from female to male. Arthur Edward 
Rice, a transgender woman who was born a biological man, filed a petition to 
change her legal name to a woman’s name, Angie Rice, and to change her sex 
designation from male to female. Both petitions stated that the petitioners were 
not listed on the sex offender registry, involved in any legal proceedings, on 
probation or parole, seeking to avoid creditors, or seeking the name and sex 
designation changes for any fraudulent purpose. The district court granted the 
petitioners’ requests to change their legal names, but denied their requests to 
change their sex designations. The court erred.  
Both petitions set forth how the petitioners underwent hormone therapy to 
change their appearances irreversibly and how both petitioners have—and were 
viewed by others as having—a gender identity different from what was listed on 
their birth certificates. Because both petitioners showed that their legal sex 
designations do not reflect their gender identities, this court should reverse.  
                                              
1 This brief refers to the petitioners with the pronouns matching their gender 
identity, not the pronouns matching the sex designations on their birth certificates. 
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Statement of the Issues 
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in declining to apply, to a petition 
for change of sex designation, general common law principles governing 
petitions for name changes, where the statute suggests that the court should treat 
name changes and sex changes similarly. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews questions of statutory 
interpretation for correctness. Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, 
¶ 12, 267 P.3d 863. 
Preservation: This issue is preserved. (C.R.69-70,R.R.57,83.) 
Issue 2: Whether the district court erred in determining that a petition for 
change of sex designation presents a nonjusticiable political question until the 
Utah Legislature expressly articulates standards and procedures for a sex 
change. 
Standard of Review: This court reviews questions of jurisdiction for 
correctness. Canfield v. Layton City, 2005 UT 60, ¶ 10, 122 P.3d 622. 




The following statutes are of central importance to the appeal and are set 
forth at Addenda E and F: 
Utah Code § 26-2-11. Name or sex change—
Registration of court order and amendment of birth 
certificate 
 (1) When a person born in this state has a name change 
or sex change approved by an order of a Utah district 
court or a court of competent jurisdiction of another 
state or a province of Canada, a certified copy of the 
order may be filed with the state registrar with an 
application form provided by the registrar. 
(2)(a) Upon receipt of the application, a certified copy of 
the order, and payment of the required fee, the state 
registrar shall review the application, and if complete, 
register it and note the fact of the amendment on the 
otherwise unaltered original certificate. 
(b) The amendment shall be registered with and 
become a part of the original certificate and a certified 
copy shall be issued to the applicant without 
additional cost. 
Utah Code § 42-1-1. By petition to district court—
Contents 
Any natural person, desiring to change his name, may 
file a petition therefor in the district court of the county 
where he resides, setting forth: 
(1) The cause for which the change of name is sought. 
(2) The name proposed. 
(3) That he has been a bona fide resident of the county 
for the year immediately prior to the filing of the 
petition. 
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Statement of the Case 
1. Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This appeal concerns two petitions, filed by two transgender individuals, 
to change their names and sex designations with the state registrar. (C.R.9-
13,R.R.1-4.)2 In both cases, the court agreed to order the state registrar to change 
the name but not the sex designation. (C.R.19,68-73,R.R.55-58.) 
2. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Childers-Gray is a transgender man who was born a biological 
woman. (C.R.10-11,41.) His birth name was Jenny Sean Pace. (C.R.10.) Although 
his birth certificate identifies his sex as female, he holds himself out as male to his 
family, friends, and the public. (C.R.10.) He “lives 100% as a male.” (C.R.2.) 
After being diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, he underwent 
hormone therapy to change his physical appearance. (C.R.2,41.) The hormones 
changed his voice, caused his female sex organs to no longer function, changed 
his body hair growth, and changed his breast tissue. (C.R.41.) By the time he filed 
his petition, he had been treated with hormone therapy for more than three 
years. (C.R.2,41.) These changes are irreversible. (C.R.41.)  
Angie Rice is a transgender woman who was born a biological man. 
(R.R.1-2,27,66-70.) Her birth name was Arthur Edward Rice. (R.R.1.) Although 
her birth certificate identifies her as male, she holds herself out as female to her 
                                              
2 Mr. Childers-Gray and Ms. Rice cite to their respective records using “C.R.” 
and “R.R.” 
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family, friends, and the public “in every aspect of [her] life.” (R.R.5,71.) She “lives 
100% as a female.” (R.R.6.) 
Like Mr. Childers-Gray, after being diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria, she 
underwent hormone therapy to change her physical appearance. (R.R.5,6,68.) By 
the time she filed her petition, she had been treated with hormone therapy for 
five years. (R.R.6.) 
Mr. Childers-Gray and Ms. Rice each filed a petition in the district court, 
seeking an order changing the sex designations on their birth certificates.3 (C.R.9-
15,R.R.1-41.) Only one statute governs sex designation changes, and it treats 
name changes and sex designation changes similarly. Utah Code § 26-2-11. It 
provides that when a person “has a name change or sex change approved by an 
order of a Utah district court,” the person may file the order with the state 
registrar, who must amend the person’s birth certificate. Id. 
A different statute, section 42-1-1, codifies the common law test for what 
must be included in a petition for name change, but it does not mention petitions 
for sex designation changes. It provides that a petition for name change must 
include: (i) the proposed name, (ii) the reason for the change, and (iii) that the 
petitioner has been a resident of the county for at least one year. Utah Code 
§ 42-1-1. No similar statute describes what must be included in a petition for a 
sex designation change. 
                                              
3 Mr. Childers-Gray filed his petition pro se but was later assisted by counsel. 
(C.R.3,21.)  
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Both Mr. Childers-Gray’s and Ms. Rice’s petitions included the reasons for 
the requested name and sex designation changes. Specifically, the petitions 
included letters from a doctor, stating that each of them had been treated for 
Gender Identity Disorder and had undergone “the appropriate clinical 
treatment” for the gender transition. (C.R.2;R.R.6.)  
Ms. Rice’s petition also stated that changing the sex indicated on her legal 
documents “will prevent confusion, embarrassment, loss of employment 
opportunities, conflict with law enforcement,” problems boarding aircraft, and 
potential violence. (R.R.2.) She testified that, since the age of eight, she felt like a 
woman trapped in a man’s body. (R.R.66.) Because of this, she suffered 
significant emotional distress when she presented as a man, hiding her true self. 
(R.R.69-70.) And now that she presents as a woman, she suffers when she must 
present her identification card, which identifies her as a man. She is subjected to 
invasive and embarrassing scrutiny, including pat-downs, because her 
“documentation doesn’t match who [she is].” (R.R. 76-77.) 
The petitions included the proposed new names, and both petitioners 
stated that they had been residents of the counties where they lived for at least 
one year. (C.R.4,92;R.R.1.) The petitions also stated that the petitioners were not 
listed on the sex offender registry, involved in any legal proceedings, on 
probation or parole, seeking to avoid creditors, or seeking the name and sex 
designation changes for any fraudulent purpose. (C.R.4,R.R.3,8.) 
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The court entered orders that granted the name changes, ruling that all of 
the statutory requirements had been satisfied. (C.R.19,R.R.57-58.) But the court 
refused to order a sex designation change in either case because the legislature 
has not provided guidance on when a petition for sex designation change should 
be granted. (C.R.69-73,R.R.57-58,83-85.)  
In Ms. Rice’s case, the court ruled that “[t]he procedure for obtaining a 
sex/gender marker change must be set forth by the legislature” before they may 
be considered by the court. (R.R.57,83.) The court ruled that it was “prohibited 
from invading the legislature’s prerogative on this issue.” (R.R.57,83-84.) 
In Mr. Childers-Gray’s case, the court reached the same conclusion, stating 
that the petition for sex designation change must be denied “because there is no 
statute in the State of Utah which sets forth either standards or procedures under 
which the court may consider such a request.” (C.R.69.) The court ruled that the 
lack of legislative guidance rendered the question of whether to change a sex 
designation to be a nonjusticiable political question under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 209 (1962). (C.R.71.) 
But the court further ruled that the petition for sex designation change 
must be denied under the law governing petitions for name and sex changes. The 
court noted that a petition for name change must be denied if it will “affect the 
legal rights or duties of either the petitioner or anyone else.” (C.R.72.) Applying 
those principles to a petition for sex designation change, the court suggested that 
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petitions for sex designation changes must always be denied because “any change 
in the rights or duties of [the] Petitioner will necessarily change rights and duties 
of others that interact with [the] Petitioner.” (C.R.72 (emphasis added).) The 
court noted, for example, that changing one’s sex could change applicable 
insurance rates, require a person to register for the draft, change the likelihood of 
success in an athletic competition, hinder creditors, or frustrate criminal 
prosecution. (C.R.72.) 
The court therefore entered orders in Mr. Childers-Gray case, changing his 
name to Sean but requiring that his birth certificate continue to identify him as 
female. (C.R.17,19.) The court entered a similar order in Ms. Rice’s case, changing 
her name to Angie but requiring that her birth certificate continue to identify her 
as male. (R.R.57.) 
Mr. Childers-Gray and Ms. Rice both appealed the denials of their 
petitions for sex designation changes, and this court consolidated their appeals. 
(C.R.75,R.R.59; Feb. 22, 2017 Order.) 
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Summary of the Argument 
The district court had common law and statutory authority to approve a 
sex designation change, just as it had authority to approve a name change. 
Indeed, Utah law recognizes that a person’s legal status—the designations on a 
birth certificate—can be changed to reflect the reality of the person’s identity, 
and in particular a person’s legal name and sex designation.  
This court should clarify that district courts should order a change in sex 
designation if the change will reflect the petitioner’s gender identity. The test for 
changing a sex designation applies the general principles that govern the test for 
name changes. The fact that the legislature codified “sex changes” together with 
name changes confirms that the general test is the same. Under the test for name 
change, a petitioner shows that the proposed name accurately reflects the 
person’s identity. For a change in sex designation, the petition must show that 
the new sex designation accurately reflects the person’s gender identity. 
Fortunately, the Utah Code explains how one proves gender identity—i.e., 
with evidence of “medical history, care or treatment of the gender identity, 
consistent and uniform assertion of the gender identity, or other evidence that 
the gender identity is sincerely held, part of a person’s core identity, and not 
being asserted for an improper purpose.” Utah Code § 57-21-2(16). Here, Ms. 
Rice and Mr. Childers-Gray demonstrated that their sex designations did not 




The district court erred when it ruled that it lacked authority to adjudicate 
the petitions. District courts have common law and statutory authority to 
approve a sex designation change. And courts should approve a change where, 
like in both cases here, the person presents evidence that the change will reflect 
the person’s gender identity. 
1. The District Court Erred in Ruling that It Lacks Authority to Adjudicate 
a Petition for a Sex Designation Change 
The district court ruled that it lacked authority to consider a petition for 
sex designation change because the statute did not provide the “standards or 
procedures under which the court may consider such a request.” (C.R.69, see also 
R.R.57,83.) The court also ruled that the absence of legislative guidance rendered 
the issue a nonjusticiable political question. (C.R.71.) 
But the court has both common law and statutory authority to approve a 
sex designation change, just as it has authority to approve a name change. And 
because the legislature enacted a statute that contemplates sex changes, the 
adjudication of a sex designation change petition presents a question of statutory 
interpretation, not a political question. The district court had authority to 
adjudicate the petitions here. 
 12 
1.1 Utah District Courts Have Authority to Approve Changes to a 
Person’s Legal Status, Including a Sex Designation 
Under the common law, district courts have authority to change a person’s 
legal status to reflect the reality of the person’s life. Indeed, as courts of general 
jurisdiction, district courts may adjudicate any matters that affect the legal rights 
of citizens. Utah Const. art. VIII, §§ 1, 5; Utah Code § 78A-5-102. And Utah law 
recognizes that a person’s legal status—or the designations on his or her birth 
certificate—should be changed to reflect the reality of his or her identity. 
Using this authority, courts have changed a person’s marital status to 
reflect the fact that the person is living as a married person, and courts have 
changed a person’s legal name to reflect the name the person uses in daily life. 
Courts have the same authority to change a person’s sex designation to reflect 
the fact that the person is living as a member of the opposite sex. 
The common law recognizes that a person’s marital status should be 
changed to reflect the person’s life as a married person, even though the 
marriage was not solemnized. Indeed, this court has long recognized a court’s 
authority to change a person’s marital status to reflect a common law marriage 
that was informally entered into in the past. E.g., Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791, 794 
(Utah 1994). The marriage is established by the couple’s behavior—cohabitation, 
sharing marital rights and duties, and holding themselves out as husband and 
wife. Id. at 792. Thus, the rule recognizes that society should consider a couple to 
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be married if they behave as if they are married, regardless of whether the 
marriage was ever solemnized. 
The common law also recognizes a person’s right to change his name. This 
court has recognized that a district court’s authority to approve a name change 
derives from the common law, which permitted a person to “adopt another 
name at will,” as long as it is not done for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose. In re 
Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 8, 31 P.3d 519; In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 1996). 
The common law rule recognizes that society will identify a person by the name 
under which he holds himself out, even if it is not his legal, given name. Porter, 
2001 UT 70, ¶ 11; Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834.  
The rule reflects a centuries-long tradition of men who abandoned their 
given names and assumed a name of their choice. Smith v. United States Cas. Co., 
90 N.E. 947, 948-49 (N.Y. 1910) (listing Voltaire, Napoleon Bonaparte, Mark 
Twain, Ulysses S. Grant and Grover Cleveland). “While some of these names 
were merely professional pseudonyms, others were adopted as the real name, 
and in time became the only name of the person who assumed it.” Id.  
The purpose of the rule is to provide protection and prevent confusion. 
Allowing legal recognition of a person’s assumed name protects both the person 
and the general public “by producing a public record to document the change.” 
Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. Thus, legal recognition of the assumed name avoids 
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confusion and makes the person legally responsible for actions taken in the 
assumed name. Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 11. 
The Utah Legislature recognized the common law right to change one’s 
name when it enacted the statute governing name changes. Utah Code § 42-1-1. 
Although the statute enumerates what must be listed in a petition for name 
change, it does not change the common law governing the circumstances under 
which a petition may be granted. Indeed, as this court put it, the statute does not 
create the right to change a name, but instead “merely provide[s] a codified 
process to aid [the] common law right.” Porter, 2001 UT ¶ 8; Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 
at 834. Specifically, the codification “provides protection for both the applicant 
and the general public by producing a public record to document the change.” 
Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. 
District courts retain the same authority to approve a change to a person’s 
sex designation. E.g., In re Petition for Change of Birth Cert., 22 N.E.3d 707, 709 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Like a legal name, the sex listed on a birth certificate is 
assigned at birth. And like a legal name, the sex assigned at birth is not 
necessarily the sex with which the person will later wish to be identified. Because 
the common allows a person to choose how society will identify him, regardless 
of what is assigned at birth, district courts have common law authority to change 
those assignments consistent with the person’s wishes. Indeed, sex designation 
changes, like name changes, “relate principally to the legal status or 
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identification of an individual,” and “[t]here is nothing extraordinary about 
equity jurisdiction in these kinds of matters.” In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 82 (Md. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
And even if district courts lacked common law authority to approve 
changes to sex designations, the statute gives courts express statutory authority 
to do so. The statute requires the state registrar to amend a birth certificate when 
a person has a “sex change approved by an order of a Utah district court.” Utah 
Code § 26-2-11.4 The plain language of the statute unambiguously contemplates 
that Utah district courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate and approve changes to a 
person’s sex designation. 
The court’s jurisdiction is not undermined by the absence of “standards or 
procedures under which the court may consider such a request” as the district 
court worried here. (C.R.69, see also R.R.57,83.) When interpreting a statute, the 
court’s “overall goal is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
statute’s plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to 
achieve.” In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 15, 266 P.3d 702 (alteration 
and internal quotation marks omitted). And courts give effect to a statute even 
when the statute “gives no guidance” as to how it should be given effect. Duke v. 
Graham, 2007 UT 31, ¶ 31, 158 P.3d 540.  Under those circumstances, the court 
“look[s] to the policies behind” the statute to determine how to give it effect. Id. 
                                              
4 The statute does not define “sex change” but elsewhere, in the Utah Fair 
Housing Act, the Utah Code defines sex to mean gender. Utah Code § 57-21-2(22). 
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Here, the plain language of the statute reveals that the purpose of the 
statute was to give people the ability to amend their birth certificates after having 
a “sex change approved by an order of a Utah district court.” Utah Code 
§ 26-2-11(1). The statute therefore necessarily contemplates that district courts 
have authority to enter orders approving changes to sex designations.  
Indeed, district courts across the state have exercised that jurisdiction and 
approved changes to sex designations. E.g., In re Davis, Case No. 173900047 (Mar. 
27, 2017) (Second District Court); In re Cohen, Case No. 163902596 (Jan. 3, 2017) 
(Third District Court); In re Manzanares, Case No. 163901747 (Sept. 14, 2016) 
(Third District Court); In re Fairbourn, Case No. 163901213 (Aug. 18, 2016) (Third 
District Court); In re Hardy, Case No. 153400814 (Aug. 10, 2016) (Fourth District 
Court); In re South, Case No. 163400140 (July 8, 2016) (Fourth District Court); In re 
Walton, Case No. 163700026 (June 6, 2016) (Seventh District Court); In re Ivory, 
Case No. 153300116 (Feb. 2, 2016) (Third District Court); In re Carmichael, Case 
No. 153902067 (Jan. 4, 2016 ) (Third District Court); In re Collins, Case No. 
153902244 (Dec. 3, 2015) (Third District Court); In re Leavitt, Case No. 153900411 
(June 8, 2015 ) (Third District Court); In re Caldwell, Case No. 143800043 (Oct. 31, 
2014) (Eighth District Court) (attached at Addendum H). 
Courts in other jurisdictions with similar statutes have reached the same 
result, concluding that statutes permitting birth certificates to be amended are 
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merely a codification of the courts’ common law powers.5 For example, in Heilig, 
a Maryland appellate court reviewed a district court’s decision that it lacked 
jurisdiction to grant a petition to change a sex designation. 816 A.2d at 69. Like 
Utah’s statute, the Maryland statute established the procedure for amending a 
birth certificate after a sex designation change had been approved, but the statute 
did not indicate when a change should be approved. Id. at 82.  
The court held that the district court had “general equity jurisdiction” to 
grant the petition. Id. at 85. The court explained that “it is clear that, in enacting 
[the statute], the [l]egislature necessarily recognized the jurisdiction of the Circuit 
Courts to consider and grant petitions to declare a change in gender; indeed, that 
section could have no other rational meaning.” Id. at 84. Because the statute 
“does not purport to grant any new jurisdiction,” it “therefore must be taken as a 
recognition that such jurisdiction already existed.” Id. 
An Indiana appellate court reached the same conclusion even though the 
Indiana statute does not mention sex designation changes. In re Petition for 
                                              
5 Although some courts have concluded that they lacked authority to change a 
person’s sex designation, their opinions were based upon circumstances, not 
present here, that fall into four categories: (i) statutes that permit sex designation 
changes only to correct a clerical error, e.g., In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828, 831 (Ohio 
Prob. Ct. 1987); (ii) the conclusion that administrative law governs the field rather 
than the common law, e.g., Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1977); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319,323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); (iii) statutes 
that give effect orders approving sex designation changes from other jurisdictions 
but that do not authorize courts in the state to enter such orders, e.g., In re 
McReynolds, 502 S.W.3d 884, 886 (Tex. App. 2016); or (iv) the absence of a statute 
permitting sex changes at all,; K. v. Health Div., Dep’t of Human Res., 560 P.2d 1070, 
1071 (Or. 1977) (en banc). 
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Change of Birth Certificate, 22 N.E.3d 707, 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Indeed, the 
Indiana statute provides only that “[t]he state department may make additions to 
or corrections in a certificate of birth on receipt of adequate documentary 
evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Like the district court here, the 
Indiana district court “concluded that it did not have authority” to approve a sex 
designation change because the legislature “had not yet spoken on the issue.” Id. 
at 708. But the appellate court disagreed. Id. at 710.  
The appellate court ruled that, “[i]n light of this statute, as well as the 
inherent equity power of a court of general jurisdiction, . . . the trial court had 
authority to grant the petition.” Id. at 709. The court explained that the lack of 
legislative guidance did not undermine that jurisdiction: “The legislature is free 
to craft specific requirements. Without such guidance, however, it is our view 
that the ultimate focus should be on whether the petition is made in good faith 
and not for a fraudulent or unlawful purpose.” Id. at 710; see also In re Taylor, No. 
03CA1753, 2003 WL 22382512, at *1, 5 (D.C. Super. Ct.) (statute granted 
jurisdiction to grant sex designation change order where statute stated that 
“upon receipt of a certified copy of an order of the [c]ourt indicated that the sex 
of an individual has been changed by surgical procedure . . . the certificate of 
birth shall be amended” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Here, by enacting section 26-2-11, the legislature recognized that courts 
have authority to order changes to birth certificates. The district court erred. 
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1.2 Because the Utah Code Contemplates Changes to Sex 
Designations, the Adjudication of a Petition Raises a Question of 
Statutory Interpretation, Not a Political Question 
In Mr. Childers-Gray’s case, the district court ruled that the lack of 
legislative guidance in the statute rendered the question of whether to order the 
change of a sex designation on a birth certificate a nonjusticiable political 
question under Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962). (C.R.71.) Specifically, the 
court held that “the principles of judicial restraint and constraint recognized in 
Baker v. Carr, and expressly set forth in Utah’s Constitution, preclude any effort 
of the court to determine the procedural and substantive criteria for the granting 
of a sex-change order, or to approve a sex-change request in the absence of such 
criteria.” (C.R.71.) But the political question doctrine prevents courts from 
considering issues beyond their jurisdiction, not questions that the legislature 
squarely places within their authority. 
The political question doctrine is based upon the separation of powers in 
the Utah and the U.S. Constitutions. Skokos v. Corradini, 900 P.2d 539, 541 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995). Both constitutions establish “three distinct departments” of 
government—legislative, executive, and judicial—and declare that no branch 
may exercise the powers belonging to another branch. Utah Const. art. V, § 1; 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1. The political question doctrine 
“prevents judicial interference in matters wholly within the control and 
discretion of other branches of government.” Skokos, 900 P.2d at 541.  
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A case involves a political question if “there is a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 195 (2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). It applies, for example, to prevent a court from interfering with 
the legislature’s constitutional right to make decisions concerning the 
qualifications of its members and to resolve contests for seats in the legislature. 
State v. Evans, 735 P.2d 29, 32 (Utah 1987); Ellison v. Barnes, 63 P. 899, 900 (Utah 
1901). 
But where the legislature has enacted a statute, the court’s interpretation of 
the statute does not present a political question. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191-201; 
Corradini, 900 P.2d at 541. In those circumstances, the courts “are not being asked 
to supplant a [policy] decision of the political branches with the courts’ own 
unmoored determination of what [the policy] should be.” Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 
196. Instead, the issue involves the enforcement of “a specific statutory right,” a 
question of statutory interpretation that “is a familiar judicial exercise.” Id. 
Indeed, “one of the Judiciary’s characteristic roles is to interpret statutes,” and 
courts “cannot shirk this responsibility merely because [the] decision may have 
significant political overtones.” Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 
221, 230 (1986). 
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The interpretation of Utah’s statute does not present a political question. 
Although changing a sex designation on a birth certificate is related to issues of 
sexuality that might have political overtones, there is not a “textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department” nor “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving” the consideration of sex designation change petitions. Zivotofsky, 566 
U.S. at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the legislature expressly 
recognized the court’s authority to consider petitions to change sex designations 
when it enacted section 26-2-11. The issue presents only a question of statutory 
interpretation, an exercise well within the powers of a court.  
2. The District Court Should Have Exercised Its Authority to Allow 
Ms. Rice and Mr. Childers-Gray to Change Their Legal Sex Designations 
to Conform to Their Gender Identities  
The district court should have granted both petitions to allow Ms. Rice’s 
and Mr. Childers-Gray’s sex designations to reflect their gender identities. 
Although in section 26-2-11 the legislature recognized that district courts have 
authority to enter orders approving changes to sex designations, the legislature 
did not expressly provide guidance on when courts should exercise that 
authority. District courts must therefore rely on their common law authority to 
identify the test for when to approve a change to a sex designation, just as district 
courts developed a common law test for when to grant a name change.  
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But in light of the well-established law governing name changes, the fact 
that the legislature codified “sex changes” together with name changes suggests 
that the legislature intended district courts to apply to sex designation changes 
the good cause test developed by courts to evaluate name changes. Under that 
test, a name change petition should be granted if the petitioner shows that the 
proposed name accurately reflects the person’s identity. Applying this test to 
petitions for sex designation changes, a change should be granted if the proposed 
sex accurately reflects the person’s gender identity. 
Notably, in Utah, surgery is not a prerequisite for changing a person’s sex 
designation. Although the statutes in many states—and the Model State Vital 
Statistics Act—include surgery as a prerequisite, the Utah Legislature omitted 
any surgical requirement. Thus, although the legislature left to courts the task of 
determining when to approve a sex designation change, the legislature was clear 
that surgery is not part of that test. 
2.1 Under Utah Law, a Person May Obtain a Name Change When the 
Proposed Name Reflects the Person’s Identity 
With respect to name changes, Utah law recognizes that a person may, at 
will, “select the name by which he is known, within very broad limits.” In re 
Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 519; In re Cruchelow, 926 P.2d 833, 834 (Utah 
1996). Thus, name change petitions “should generally be granted.” Cruchelow, 
926 P.2d at 834. The rule promotes clarity and avoids confusion by ensuring that 
the identity that a person actually uses is consistent with the identity listed on 
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the person’s government identification. Id. at 834; Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 11. Giving 
legal status to the name a person uses in public eliminates the confrontations that 
can ensue when members of the public perceive as fraudulent the difference 
between the name used by the person and the name listed on the person’s 
government identification. In re Harris, 707 A.2d 225, 228 (Pa. 1997). 
Section 42-1-1 of the Utah Code reflects this common law rule by requiring 
a petition for a name change to include only (i) the proposed name, “[t]he cause 
for which the change of name is sought,” and (iii) that the person has been a 
resident of the county for at least one year. Utah Code § 42-1-1. The court must 
grant the petition if, at the hearing,6 there is “proof in open court of the 
allegations of the petition and that there exists proper cause for granting the 
same.” Id. § 42-1-2. And proper cause exists when changing the person’s name 
will allow his legal name to conform to his identity. Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 11; 
Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. 
A court may deny a petition only if it identifies a “substantial reason,” 
with “factual support” that justifies denial. Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834. Those 
reasons include “factual proof of an unworthy motive, the possibility of fraud on 
the public, or the choice of a name that is bizarre, unduly lengthy, ridiculous, or 
offensive to common decency and good taste.” Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 7 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). A court may not deny a petition based upon 
                                              
6 The court may give notice of the hearing to any entity it believes might be 
affected by the change. Utah Code § 42-1-2; Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 835. 
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unsupported generalizations or concerns, including worries that the change 
could create confusion or misunderstanding, complicate government 
recordkeeping and notice requirements, cause substantial mischief, or create a 
chilling effect on potential future litigants. Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 834-35; Porter, 
2001 UT 70, ¶¶ 9-11. 
This court has had two opportunities to review a district court’s denial of a 
name change petition, and in both cases, this court reversed the denial. In the 
first case, this court considered whether a prison inmate should be able to change 
his name while in custody. Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 833-34. The inmate wanted to 
change his name to “reflect[] his religious beliefs.” Id. at 834. Specifically, he had 
become a devout Muslim, and the scriptures of the Islamic faith direct Muslims 
to adopt names associated with Allah. Id. at 834 & n.2.  
The district court denied the petition, explaining that the name change 
would complicate the prison’s recordkeeping and create problems with 
providing notice of parole hearings: “[T]he prisoner’s records become confused 
at the prison. It is difficult to reestablish new records for an inmate who has a 
name change. It also presents problems with the Board of Pardons, when 
hearings are held, and notice is given of those hearings to the general public.” Id. 
at 834.  
But this court reversed, citing the rule that name change petitions “should 
generally be granted unless sought for a wrongful or fraudulent purpose.” Id. at 
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834 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court held that the reasons that the 
district court articulated were “unsupported generalizations and speculations,” 
which resulted in an “arbitrary denial.” Id. at 835 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). The court remanded with directions either to grant the petition or to 
hold an evidentiary hearing to consider whatever evidence might mitigate 
against the petition. Id. 
In the second case, this court held that the petitioner was entitled to 
change his name to Santa Claus. Porter, 2001 UT 70, ¶ 12. The petition explained 
that “he resembles the fictional character Santa Claus and does numerous 
charitable and business activities in the Santa Claus persona, and that the name 
change is for these functions and public relations purposes.” Id. ¶ 6 (alterations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The district court denied the petition, even though it ruled that the 
petitioner did not seek the name change for an improper purpose. Id. ¶ 10. The 
district court reasoned that the name change “would likely create confusion 
[and] misunderstanding,” could “allow for substantial mischief,” and “could 
cause a substantial chilling effect for persons otherwise entitled to exercise access 
to the courts but who would be hesitant to sue Santa Claus.” Id. ¶ 9 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
This court again reversed, noting that “[t]he record does not contain any 
evidence to support these concerns,” and regardless, that the concerns were not 
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sufficient to deny the petition. Id. ¶¶ 11, 13. The court agreed that the petitioner’s 
choice to change his name to Santa Claus “may be thought by some to be unwise, 
and it may very well be more difficult for him to conduct his business and his 
normal everyday affairs as a result.” Id. ¶ 11. But the court explained that the 
petitioner “has the right to select the name by which he is known, within very 
broad limits.” Id. The court held that it was significant that he “already tells 
others that he is Santa Claus,” and thus, “[a]llowing him to legally change his 
name to reflect his practice of doing so is more likely to avoid greater confusion 
than to create it.” Id. The court remanded with instructions to enter the name 
change order. Id. ¶ 13. Unlike in Cruchelow, this court did not permit the district 
court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to consider any evidence that might 
support the court’s concerns. Id.; Cruchelow, 926 P.2d at 835. 
2.2 Under Utah Law, a Person May Obtain a Sex Designation Change 
When the Proposed Sex Reflects the Person’s Gender Identity 
Like the approval of name changes, a court should approve a change of a 
person’s sex designation when the change will reflect the person’s identity. The 
legislature has provided little guidance concerning when a court should approve 
a change in a person’s sex designation. As discussed above, the lack of guidance 
indicates that the legislature intended for courts to use their common law 
authority to develop the test for when sex designations should be changed.  
But the plain language of Section 26-2-11 provides two starting points for 
developing that test. First, the fact that name changes and sex designation 
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changes are mentioned together—“name change or sex change”—suggests that 
the legislature intended sex designation change petitions to be considered under 
the well-developed law governing name changes. Second, the fact that the 
legislature omitted any surgical requirement—even though many states require 
surgery—suggests that the legislature did not intend surgery to be a prerequisite 
for changing a person’s sex designation in Utah. 
The policies underlying name changes and sex designation changes are 
similar. Like a person’s name, a person’s sex is designated at birth. Like a name, 
a person may decide to adopt and identify with a sex different from the one 
designated at birth, and to present to the public as a member of the adopted sex. 
In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 79 (Md. 2003) (gender “may be, or possibly may become, 
other than what is recorded on the person’s birth certificate”). Like the legal 
recognition of a name change, legal recognition of a change to a person’s sex 
designation promotes clarity and avoids confusion by ensuring that the identity 
that a person actually uses does not conflict with the identity listed on the 
person’s government identification.  
The test governing name changes and sex designation changes should also 
be similar. Just as a person may change his name to the one that reflects his 
identity, a person should be able to change his sex designation to the one that 
reflects his gender identity.  
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The Utah Legislature has expressly recognized that a person’s birth 
certificate might not necessarily reflect the person’s actual identity. Specifically, 
in the Utah Fair Housing Act, the legislature stated that a person’s “gender 
identity”—i.e., the “innate sense of being male or female”—is based upon the 
person’s subjective beliefs about his or her “core identity” and the sex the person 
holds himself or herself out as: 
“Gender identity” has the meaning provided in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5). A person’s 
gender identity can be shown by providing evidence, 
including, but not limited to, medical history, care or 
treatment of the gender identity, consistent and uniform 
assertion of the gender identity, or other evidence that the 
gender identity is sincerely held, part of a person’s core 
identity, and not being asserted for an improper purpose. 
Utah Code § 57-21-2(16); Dawson v. H&H Elec., Inc., No. 4:14CV00583 SWW, 2015 
WL 5437101, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 15, 2015) (defining “gender identity” as the 
“innate sense of being male or female”). And the DSM-5 defines gender as the 
“public[ly] (and usually legally recognized) lived role as boy or girl, man or 
woman.” Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 451 (5th ed. 2013). 
The legislature has also expressly stated that “sex” and “gender” are 
synonymous. Utah Code § 57-21-2(22) (defining “sex” to mean gender). Thus, the 
legislature has recognized that a person’s sex, like a name, can change, based 
upon his subjective beliefs about himself and how he presents himself to others. 
In defining “gender identity,” the legislature provided a useful basis for 
courts to develop the test for the showing required to change a person’s sex 
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designation. The definition is consistent with the good cause test in the name 
change context—both gender identity and the name change test reflect the fact 
that a person’s identity is formed by a person’s subjective beliefs about himself or 
herself. And like a name, a person’s gender identity can differ from his or her 
designated sex only if it is “not being asserted for an improper purpose.” Utah 
Code § 57-21-2(16). 
Indeed, Utah district courts considering petitions for sex designation 
changes have considered factors identical to the gender identity factors. 
Specifically, courts in the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts have 
granted petitions after considering whether the petitioners held themselves out 
to family and friends as a member of the opposite sex, whether the petitioner had 
been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder or Gender Dysphoria, and 
whether the petitioner had undergone any hormone or medical treatment. 7 
These factors, which establish a person’s gender identity, were sufficient to 
                                              
7 Specifically, counsel is aware of—and has attached at Addendum H—the 
following cases in which courts granted petitions for sex designation changes: In re 
Davis, Case No. 173900047 (Mar. 27, 2017) (Second District Court); In re Cohen, Case 
No. 163902596 (Jan. 3, 2017) (Third District Court); In re Manzanares, Case No. 
163901747 (Sept. 14, 2016) (Third District Court); In re Fairbourn, Case No. 
163901213 (Aug. 18, 2016) (Third District Court); In re Hardy, Case No. 153400814 
(Aug. 10, 2016) (Fourth District Court); In re South, Case No. 163400140 (July 8, 
2016) (Fourth District Court); In re Walton, Case No. 163700026 (June 6, 2016) 
(Seventh District Court); In re Ivory, Case No. 153300116 (Feb. 2, 2016) (Third 
District Court); In re Carmichael, Case No. 153902067 (Jan. 4, 2016 ) (Third District 
Court); In re Collins, Case No. 153902244 (Dec. 3, 2015) (Third District Court); In re 
Leavitt, Case No. 153900411 (June 8, 2015 ) (Third District Court); In re Caldwell, 
Case No. 143800043 (Oct. 31, 2014) (Eighth District Court). 
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establish the good cause required to grant the petition. E.g., In re Davis, Case No. 
173900047 (Mar. 27, 2017) (Second District Court); In re Caldwell, Case No. 
143800043 (Oct. 31, 2014) (Eighth District Court) (attached at Addendum H). 
These courts also required the petitioners to satisfy the other requirements 
of a name change. Thus, the petitioners were required to satisfy the conditions of 
section 42-1-1 by establishing that they were residents of their county for at least 
a year, and by establishing that they were not seeking the change for an 
improper purpose. To show a lack of improper purpose, the petitioners 
established that they were not seeking the change for a fraudulent purpose or to 
defraud creditors, that they had given notice to any interested third parties, and 
that they were not listed on the sex offender registry (a factor uniquely important 
in the sex designation context). (Add. H.) 
Courts in other jurisdictions agree. These courts have held that good cause 
for changing a sex designation was shown with medical evidence regarding the 
gender transition, and the petitioner’s “genuine desire” to have his identification 
documents match his gender identity. In re Petition for Change of Birth Certificate, 
22 N.E.3d, 707, 710 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014); see also Heilig, 816 A.2d at 87 (“Almost all 
courts have recognized that the question of whether and how gender can be 
changed is one where the law depends upon and, to a large extent, must follow 
medical facts (medical facts, in this context, to include relevant psychological 
facts).”). 
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Notably, the legislature has indicated that it did not intend surgery to be a 
prerequisite for changing a person’s sex designation in Utah. Many statutes that 
permit changes to sex designations require a finding “that gender has been 
changed by surgical procedure.” Heilig, 816 A.2d at 86 (alteration and internal 
quotation marks omitted).8 The Model Vital Statistics Act also contemplates a sex 
designation change only after a person’s sex “has been changed by surgical 
procedure.” Id. at 82.  
Utah is among several states whose statutes contemplate sex designation 
changes but do not mandate a surgical prerequisite.9 The omission is dispositive, 
as this court “seek[s] to give effect to omissions in statutory language by 
presuming all omissions to be purposeful.” 2 Ton Plumbing, L.L.C. v. Thorgaard, 
2015 UT 29, ¶ 32, 345 P.3d 675. 
                                              
8 E.g., Ala. Code § 22-9A-19(d); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-337(A)( 3); Ark. Code 
Ann. § 20-18-307(d); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-2-115(4); Ga. Code Ann. § 31-10-23(e); 
Iowa Code § 144.23(3); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 213.121(5); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:62; 
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 46, § 13(e); Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.2831(c); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 
193.215(9); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 71-604.01; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 26:8-40.12; N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24-14-25(D); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-118(b)(4); Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-269(E). In 
addition, some states grant regulatory authority to agencies that have 
promulgated regulations that include a surgical requirement. E.g., Conn. Agencies 
Regs. § 19a-41-9(e); N.D. Admin. Code § 33-04-12-02(1). 
9 E.g., Cal. Health & Safety Code § 103426; Haw. Rev. Stat. § 338-17.7(a); 
Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. § 4-211(b); Or. Rev. Stat. § 33.460; Utah Code Ann. 
§ 26-2-11; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5112; Wis. Stat. § 69.15(1)(a). Some states have 
granted authority to agencies, which have in turn promulgated regulations that do 
not include a surgical mandate. E.g., Nev. Admin. Code § 440.130; N.H. Code R. 
tit. I, ch. 5-C:87(V); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit 10, § 35.2 (2014); R.I. R. & 
Regs. Governing Vital Records part IX, § 35.5(2); Wyo. Code. R. HLTH VR, ch. 10, 
§ 4(e)(iii) (2004). 
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Equally important, if this court interprets the common law test to require 
surgery, then the court’s interpretation would be unconstitutional as a violation 
of equal protection principles, since sex-reassignment surgery is 
disproportionately more difficult and expensive for transgender men than for 
transgender women. Heilig, 816 A.2d at 78. 
As a preliminary matter, it is unclear what surgeries would be sufficient to 
satisfy the test. Indeed, depending upon a person’s financial means, there are a 
variety of surgeries available to people seeking to change their physical 
appearance to conform to their gender identities. Some of those surgeries include 
facial reconstruction, orchiectomy (removal of gonads), vaginoplasty 
(construction of vagina), mammoplasty (construction of breasts), mastectomy, 
hysterectomy, vaginectomy, and phalloplasty. E.g., Heilig, 816 A.2d at 78; Harris, 
707 A.2d at 226.  
Although each of these is a “surgical procedure,” it is unclear which are 
sufficient to satisfy the statutes. In fact, at least one court has suggested that a 
person must undergo all of the surgical procedures before being entitled to a sex 
designation change. In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309-10 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005). Thus, requiring a surgical procedure as a prerequisite for a sex 
designation change could serve to complicate, rather than clarify, the test for 
when a person is entitled to a sex designation change.  
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Regardless, even if the surgical requirement were defined, the requirement 
would violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution and 
the uniform operation of laws provision of the Utah Constitution. U.S. Const. 
amend XIV, § 1 (prohibiting states from “deny[ing] to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”); Utah Const. art. I, § 24 (“All laws 
of a general nature shall have uniform operation.”). Those provisions require that 
laws must treat men and women similarly.  
Specifically, the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution permits a 
law to disproportionately impact a particular sex only if the impact is 
“substantially related” to an “important governmental objective[].”Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982). The uniform operation of laws 
provision in the Utah Constitution provides even greater protection by requiring 
that persons similarly situated must be treated similarly. State v. Drej, 2010 UT 
35, ¶ 33, 233 P.3d 476.  
Requiring sex reassignment surgery disproportionately affects transgender 
men. Because of the increased technical difficulty in performing surgeries that 
alter male genitalia, the cost of sex reassignment surgery is “much higher” for 
transgender men—twice as much as the cost for transgender women. Heilig, 816 
A.2d at 78. Thus, this court should not adopt a test that includes a surgical 
requirement. 
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2.3 Because the Sex Designations on Ms. Rice’s and Mr. Childers-
Gray’s Birth Certificates Do Not Reflect their Gender Identities, 
the District Court Erred When It Denied Their Petitions 
Ms. Rice and Mr. Childers-Gray demonstrated that their sex designations 
did not match their gender identities, and there was no evidence that they sought 
the changes for an improper purpose. The district court erred in denying their 
petitions. 
Mr. Childers-Gray’s birth certificate designates his sex as female, but his 
gender identity is male. (C.R.10-11,41.) His medical history shows that he has 
been diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, and has been treated with 
hormone therapy to change his physical appearance. (C.R.2,41.) The hormones 
changed his voice, caused his female sex organs to no longer function, changed 
his body hair growth, and changed his breast tissue. (C.R.41.) These changes are 
irreversible. (C.R.41.) This is “the appropriate clinical treatment” for his gender 
transition. (C.R.2.) By the time he filed his petition, he had been treated with 
hormone therapy for more than three years. (C.R.2,41.) He consistently and 
uniformly holds himself out as male to his family, friends, and the public. 
(C.R.10.) He “lives 100% as a male.” (C.R.2.) 
Similarly, Ms. Rice’s birth certificate designates her sex as male, but her 
gender identity is female. (R.R.1-2,27,66-70.) Her medical history shows that she 
has been diagnosed with Gender Dysphoria, and has been treated with hormone 
therapy to change her physical appearance. (R.R.5,6,68.) This is “the appropriate 
clinical treatment” for the gender transition. (R.R.6.) By the time she filed her 
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petition, she had been treated with hormone therapy for five years. (R.R.6.) She 
consistently and uniformly holds herself out as female to her family, friends, and 
the public “in every aspect of [her] life.” (R.R.5,71.) She “lives 100% as a female.” 
(R.R.6.) 
Ms. Rice’s petition also stated that changing the sex indicated on her legal 
documents “will prevent confusion, embarrassment, loss of employment 
opportunities, conflict with law enforcement,” problems boarding aircraft, and 
possible violence. (R.R.2.) She testified that, since the age of eight, she felt like a 
woman trapped in a man’s body. (R.R.66.) Because of this, she suffered 
significant emotional distress when she presented as a man, hiding her true self, 
(R.R.69-70.) And now that she presents as a woman, she suffers when she must 
present her identification card, which identifies her as a man. She is subjected to 
invasive and embarrassing scrutiny, including pat-downs, because her 
“documentation doesn’t match who [she is].” (R.R. 76-77.) 
Their petitions also complied with the remaining requirements of the name 
change statute. Both petitioners stated that they had been residents of the 
counties where they lived for at least one year. (C.R.4,92;R.R.1.) The petitions also 
stated that the petitioners were not listed on the sex offender registry, involved 
in any legal proceedings, on probation or parole, seeking to avoid creditors, or 
seeking the name and sex designation changes for any fraudulent purpose. 
(C.R.4,R.R.3,8.) 
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The district court denied the petitions because it believed it lacked 
authority to adjudicate them, but in Mr. Childers-Gray’s case, the court also 
ruled that the petition failed under the common law test for a name change. 
(C.R.69-73,R.R.57-58,83-85.) Specifically, the court ruled that under the name 
change test, the change must be denied if it will “affect the legal rights or duties 
of either the petitioner or anyone else.” (C.R.72.) Applying those principles to a 
petition to change a sex designation, the court suggested that a petition to change 
a sex designation must always be denied because “any change in the rights or 
duties of [the] Petitioner will necessarily change rights and duties of others that 
interact with [the] Petitioner.” (C.R.72 (emphasis added).) The court noted, for 
example, that changing one’s sex could change applicable insurance rates, 
require a person to register for the draft, change the likelihood of success in an 
athletic competition, hinder creditors, or frustrate criminal prosecution. (C.R.72.) 
But under the court’s reasoning, a person could never change the sex 
designation on a birth certificate because such a change would always, 
“necessarily,” change the rights and duties of people who interact with the 
person. This would be true even for people who underwent full sex reassignment 
surgery. But because section 26-2-11 contemplates precisely this change, the 
district court’s conclusion cannot be—and is not—the law in Utah. 
Instead, the court should have entered an order approving the changes to 
Ms. Rice's and Mr. Childers-Gray's sex designations to reflect their gender 
identities. 
Conclusion 
This court should reverse the orders of the district court and remand with 
instructions to enter orders approving the sex designation changes. 
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2017. 
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